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Goleniewski, Kissinger had been recruited by the Soviets during his Army
service in Germany after the end of World War II, when he had worked as a
humble chauffeur.
Kissinger had allegedly been recruited to an espionage cell called ODRA,
where he received the code name of "BOR" or "COLONEL BOR." Some versions of
this story also specify that this cell had been largely composed of
homosexuals, and that homosexuality had been an important part of the way
that Kissinger had been picked up by the KGB. These reports were reportedly
partly supported by Golitsyn, another Soviet defector. The late James Jesus
Angleton, the CIA counterintelligence director for 20 years up to 1973, was
said to have been the U.S. official who was handed Goleniewski's report by
the British. Angleton later talked a lot about Kissinger being "objectively
a Soviet agent." It has not been established that Angleton ever ordered an
active investigation of Kissinger or ever assigned his case a codename. /
Note #1 / Note #0
Kissinger's Chinese side was very much in evidence during 1971-73 and
beyond; during these years he was obsessed with anything remotely connected
with China and sought to monopolize decisions and contacts with the highest
levels of the Chinese leadership. This attitude was dictated most of all by
the British mentality and geopolitical considerations indicated above, but
it is also unquestionable that Kissinger felt a strong personal affinity
for Zhou Enlai, Mao Zedong, and the other Chinese leaders, who had been
responsible for the genocide of 100 million of their own people after 1949.
Kissinger possessed other dimensions in addition to these, including close
links to the Zionist underworld. These will also loom large in George
Bush's career.
For all of these Kissingerian enormities, Bush now became the principal
spokesman. In the process, he was to become a Kissinger clone.
The China Card
The defining events in the first year of Bush's U.N. tenure reflected
Kissinger's geoplitical obsession with his China card. Remember that in his
1964 campaign, Bush had stated that Red China must never be admitted to the
U.N. and that if Beijing ever obtained the Chinese seat on the Security
Council, the U.S.A. must depart forthwith from the world body. This
statement came back to haunt him once or twice. His stock answer went like
this: "That was 1964, a long time ago. There's been an awful lot changed
since.... A person who is unwilling to admit that changes have taken place
is out of things these days. President Nixon is not being naive in his
China policy. He is recognizing the realities of today, not the realities
of seven years ago."
One of the realities of 1971 was that the bankrupt British had declared
themselves to be financially unable to maintain their military presence in
the Indian Ocean and the Far East, in the area "East of Suez." Part of the
timing of the Kissinger China card was dictated by the British desire to
acquire China as a c ounterweight to India in this vast area of the world,
and also to insure a U.S. military presence in the Indian Ocean, as seen
later in the U.S. development of an important base on the island of Diego
Garcia.
On a world tour during 1969, Nixon had told President Yahya Khan, the
dictator of Pakistan, that his administration wanted to normalize relations
with Red China and wanted the help of the Pakistani government in
exchanging messages. Regular meetings between the United States and Beijing
had gone on for many years in Warsaw, but what Nixon was talking about was
a total reversal of U.S. China policy. Up until 1971, the U.S.A. had
recognized the government of the Republic of China on Taiwan as the sole
sovereign and legitimate authority over China. The United States, unlike
Britain, France, and many other Western countries, had no diplomatic
relations with the Beijing Communist regime.
The Chinese seat among the five permanent members of the United Nations
Security Council was held by the government in Taipei. Every year in the
early autumn there was an attempt by the non-alignedbloc to oust Taipei
from the Security Council and replace them with Beijing, but so far this
vote had always failed because of U.S. arm-twisting in Latin America and
the rest of the Third World. One of the reasons that this arrangement had
endured so long was the immense prestige of R.O.C. President Chiang
Kai-shek and the sentimental popularity of the Kuomintang with the American
electorate. There still was a very powerful China lobby, which was
especially strong among right-wing Republicans of what had been the Taft
and Knowland factions of the party, and which Goldwater continued. Now, in
the midst of the Vietnam War, with U.S. strategic and economic power in
decline, the Anglo-American elite decided in favor of a geopolitical
alliance with China against the Soviets for the foreseeable future. This
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